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"MOBILE" HOMES?-PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE CONTROLS
The mobile home of today is a far different creature than that
from which it was bred. 1 Changes in size, appearance, safety, convenience, and desirability as a place to live have caused the modem
mobile home to bear little resemblance to its ancestors. 2 Functioning
as permanently emplaced dwelling, the mobile home has come to be
recognized as undeserving of the label "mobile."3 Other than by place
of manufacture, mobile homes have become increasingly indistinguishable from conventional single family dwellings, 4 raising the question of whether mobile homes can reasonably be restricted from areas
reserved for single family dwellings. Land controls, both public, in the
form of zoning restrictions, and private, in the form of restrictive
covenants, commonly operate to exclude mobile homes from single
family residential districts. 5 This note will examine whether mobile
homes are distinguishable from site-built homes for the purpose of
restrictions imposed by zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants
and will explore the analysis required to make such a distinction. This
note will conclude that only where a mobile home fails to compare
favorably with the other dwellings that could be erected on the site can

a

1. See, e.g., S. ADLER, THE MOBILE HOME INDUSTRY 41-42 {1973); SHEPARD'S
MOBILE HOMES AND MOBILE HOME PARKS § 1.1 (1975) (hereinafter cited as
SHEPARD'S]. For a discussion of the origins and development of mobile homes, see infra
notes 6-34 & accompanying text.
2. See B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE HOMES§§ 1.1-.2 {3d
ed. 1974).
3. R. HEGEL, MOBILE HOME ZONING, BUILDING AND SITE REGULATIONS AND
TAXATION-IMPLICATIONS FOR MICHIGAN MUNICIPALmES 1 {1970); Bartke & Gage,
Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxatz'on, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 491, 493 (1970); Note,
Mobilehomes: Present Regulation and Needed Reforms, 27 STAN. L. REv. 159 {1974);
See Burke, Financi'ng the Combined Purchase of a Mobt'le Home and Lot: New
Federal Programs Raise Usury and Lien Perfectz'on Issues, 15 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR.J. 878, 880 {1980). See also infra text accompanying notes 31-34, 71-77.
4. In Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 {1981), dis·
cussed infra at notes 78-85 & accompanying text, the Supreme Court of Michigan used
the lack of a clear distinction between mobile homes and site-built homes to invalidate
an ordinance that required all mobile homes to be in authorized mobile home parks:
The mobile home today can compare favorably with site-built housing
in size, safety and attractiveness. To be sure, mobile homes inferior in many
respects to site-built homes continue to be manufactured. But the assumption that all mobile homes are different from all site-built homes with respect
to criteria cognizable under the police power can no longer be accepted.
Id. at 313, 302 N.W.2d at 151-52.
5. See z'nfra notes 35-85, 95-117 & accompanying text.
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it be reasonably restricted from a site in a single family residential
neighborhood.
I.

THE MOBILE HOME

Mobile homes are a creation of the twentieth century. 6 Designed as
temporary living units, the first trailers 7 were without toilets or bathing
facilities, 8 consisting of approximately 175 square feet of living area. 9
Trailers more closely resembled tin cans than they resembled site-built
homes both in appearance and in comfort. Because of the housing
shortages and economic conditions prevalent during the 1930's and
1940's, these trailers were crowded into unsightly trailer camps often
unsuited for human habitation. 10
Public response to the early trailers was as could be expected;
trailers were regarded as intolerable.U Because of the overcrowded
6.

P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS§ 3.03[1] {1981); SHEPARD'S,

supra note 1, §§ 1.1-.2; Burke, supra note 3, at 879.
7. Although sometimes not distinguished, trailers are those units small
enough to be towed by a passenger car, distinct from mobile homes, which often require a special permit to be moved on the highways. See Note, supra note 3, at 159
n.l. See generally SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, §§ 2.2, 2.14, & 5.1 {1975 & Supp.
1982-83). As explained by Justice Sam D. Johnson of the Supreme Court of Texas:
The mobile home and the trailer are distinct and quite different structures. In terms of size, cost, and utilization, the mobile home constitutes a
vital form of permanent housing. The trailer, on the other hand, constitutes
a popular travel or recreational vehicle. Both the United States Congress and
the Texas Legislature have recognized the distinct status of the mobile
homes.
Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 361 (Tex. 1977) (dissent) {citing the National
Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-26
{1978) and the Mobile Homes Standards Act, TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221f
(Vernon 1971)).
8. Banke & Gage, supra note 3, at 493; Moore, The Mobile Home and the
Law, 6 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2-3 {1973); see also Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499,
504, 286 N.W. 805, 806, appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 620 {1939).
9. Cf. Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 487-88, 40 N.E.2d
925, 927 (1942) (119 square feet); R. HEGEL, supra note 3, at 2 (216 square feet);
Anderson, The Regulation and Accommodation of Mobile Homes, 1975 PLANNING,
ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN INST. 151, 155 {200 square feet); Burke, supra note 3, at
880 {160-240 square feet).
10. Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 318-19, 302 N.W.2d 146, 153
{1981); Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 507, 286 N.W. 805, 807, appeal dismissed, 309 U.S. 620 {1939); Moore, supra note 8, at 3; Note, Toward an Equitable
and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxation, 71 YALE L.J. 702, 702-03 (1962);
cf. Banke & Gage, supra note 3, at 494, 525 ("shantytown or slum on wheels," "makeshift contraption"); Carter, Problems in the Regulation and Taxation of Mobile
Homes, 48 IOWA L. REV. 16, 17 {1962) {"tin can camps").
11. See 2 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING§ 19.0 (4th ed.
1981); P. ROHAN, supra note 6, § 3.03[1]; SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 5; Moore,
supra note 8, at 2-4.
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and unsanitary conditions, it was felt that trailers and trailer camps
were clearly unacceptable as a form of housing. 12 Accordingly, the
general reaction was to enact ordinances and draft restrictive
covenants with the intent of prohibiting or severely restricting their
placement. 13 Restrictions ranged from limits on duration of staya to
total bans. 15 And only in the instance of an ordinance 16 totally excluding trailers from the entire community would the threat of judicial
invalidation arise. 17
In the post-war years, the mobile home industry grew, reaching
unprecedented production levels in the 1950's and 1960's. 18 Today,
mobile homes are said to house over ten million Americans. 19 And in
most cases, the mobile homes in which they live are little like the
trailers of fifty years ago. Current mobile homes average over 700
12. As noted in Cady v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286 N .W. 805, appeal
dismissed, 309 U.S. 620 (1939), "while the trailer serves a useful function for outings
and vacation periods, it is not a proper permanent home .... " 289 Mich. at 507, 286
N.W. at 807; see Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 525; Moore, supra note 8, at 2-4.
13. Bartke & Gage, supra note 3; Carter, supra note 10, at 17; seeP. ROHAN,
supra note 6, at§ 3.03(1].
14. Limits on duration of stay ranging from 48 hours to 90 days have been
upheld. See, e.g., Rezler v. Village of Riverside, 28 Ill. 2d 142, 190 N.E.2d 706 (1963)
(48 hours: 30 day limit per 12 month period); Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St.
120, 121 N.E.2d 11 (1954), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 923 (1955) (60 days: cannot
return for 90 days); Lower Merion Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35,
appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946) (30 days). See also SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, §
11.6; Carter, supra note 10, at 25-28; Moore, supra note 8, at 16-17.
15. See, e.g., Vickers v. Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963) (potential undesirable impact justifies exclusion).
See alsoP. ROHAN, supra note 6, at§ 3.03[3] n.32.
16. Restrictive covenants, on the other hand, would generally be upheld. See
infra notes 94-100 & accompanying text.
17. E.g., Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955);
see City of Sparta v. Brenning, 45 lll. 2d359, 259 N.E.2d 30 (1970); cf. Statev. Larson,
292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972) (burden of showing total exclusion not met);
Town of Pompey v. Parker, 53 A.D.2d 125, 385 N.Y.S.2d 959 (1976), aff'd, 44
N.Y.2d 805, 377 N.E.2d 741, 406 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1978). See also Carter, supra note
10, at 24; Moore, supra note 8, at 7. Contra Vickers v. Gloucester Twp., 37 N.J. 232,
181 A.2d 129 (1962) cert. dem'ed, 371 U.S. 233 (1963).
18. See R. HEGEL, supra note 3, at 1-8; Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at
494-95.
Mobile homes account for approximately two-thirds of all lower-cost single family
housing starts. Cf. R. HEGEL, supra note 3, at 9 (1969: 67% of housing costing under
$25,000, 94% of that under $15,000); Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 495 n.23 (1967:
75% of housing costing under $15,000); Burke, supra note 3, at 878 n.3 (1977: twothirds of housing costing under $35,000); Kuklin, Housz'ng and Technology: The
Mobile Home Experience, 44 TENN. L. REV. 765, 768 n.9 (1969: 98.3% of housing
costing under $15,000); Moore, supra note 8, at 1 (1972: 90% of housing costing
under $15,000).
19. Anderson, supra note 9, at 152-53; Burke, supra note 3, at 878 n.2;
Kuklin, supra note 18, at 767.
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square feet for a single mobile home 20 and approximately 1,500 square
feet for a double-wide model. 21 Complete with all modem conveniences, current models exhibit many options that are not readily associated with trailers, including gabled roofs, 22 utility rooms with
washing machines and dryers, 23 dishwashers, 24 fireplaces, 25 and attached two-car garages. 26
Modem mobile homes more closely resemble site-built homes than
the early trailers.U Structurally similar to prefabricated 28 and modular
housing, 29 mobile homes are now an accepted form of permanent
20. R. HEGEL, supra note 3, at 2; SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 1.2.
21. Cf. Town of Helena v. Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162 (Ala.
1980) (1, 776 square feet); Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61 Ill. 2d 168, 334
N.E.2d 131 (1975) (1,460 square feet); City of DeSoto v. Centurion Homes, Inc., 1
Kan. App. 2d 634, 573 P.2d 1081 (1977) (1,675 square feet); DeLaurentis v. Vainio,
169 Mont. 520, 549 P.2d 461 (1976) (1,536 square feet); Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M.
680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980) (1,440 square feet).
A "double-wide" mobile home consists of two single width units (generally 12
feet wide each) transported separately to the site and joined together, sometimes under
a single roof. See, e.g., DeLaurentis v. Vainio, 169 Mont. 520, 549 P.2d 461 (1976);
Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970).
22. North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 594,
248 N.W.2d 629, 630 (1976).
23. R. HEGEL, supra note 3, at 2.
24. Note, supra note 3, at 159 n.3.
25. Carter, supra note 10, at 16.
26. Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980). See Lassiter v. Bliss,
559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1977), where the list of available options includes saunas and
sunken baths. Id. at 361 (dissent). See generally The Upwardly Mobile Homes,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 20, 1982, at 64-65.
27. See, e.g., Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 316, 302 N.W.2d 146,
151 (1981); Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980); Clackamas County v.
Dunham, 30 Or. App. 595, 598, 567 P.2d 605, 607 (1977), rev'd, 282 Or. 419, 432
n.3, 579 P.2d 223, 225 n.3 (1978). See generally Kuklin, supra note 18, at 819·20.
Similarly, modern mobile home parks more closely resemble condominium com·
munities than the trailer parks of yesteryear. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 494.
See generally Anderson, supra note 9, at 162·63; Moore, supra note 8, at 3. "Mobile
home parks provide an attractive home ownership option to millions of Americans."
Environmental Communities of Pa., Inc. v. North Coventry Twp., 49 Pa. Cornrow.
Ct. 167, 170, 412 A.2d 650, 652 (1980). Many of the older parks, however, have
remarkably poor conditions. Kuklin, supra note 18, at 790. Accordingly, many states
have adopted legislation aimed at improving park conditions. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§§ 18.35.010·.090 (Michie 1969 & Supp. 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §§
4061A-67 (1978, 1980 & Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 53-3201-20 (1977 & Supp.
1981). See generally SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 6.2.
28. North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 599,
248 N.W.2d 629, 632 (1976); see SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 2.10; Banke & Gage,
supra note 3, at 495.
29. See, e.g., Town of Helena v. Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162
(Ala. 1980); Bennett v. Guthridge, 225 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1975); cf. City of DeSoto v.
Centurion Homes, Inc., 1 Kan. App. 2d 634, 573 P.2d 1081 (1977) (although similar,
defendant's mobile home not a modular home); DeLaurentis v. Vainio, 169 Mont.
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housing. 30 They are not deserving of the harsh treatment to which
they have been subjected.
No longer a trailer that can be towed by a passenger car, the
modem mobile home is too large to be easily moved. 31 Once sited,
most models (especially double-wides) require a considerable amount
of disassembly before they can be transported. 32 This has led some jurisdictions to hold a mobile home to be mobile no longer: 33 "Mobile it
was when used on the highway, but mobility ceased when it was removed from the highway, attached to the soil and occupied as living
quarters. A metamorphosis has occurred; the mobile vehicle has become a fixed residence. " 3 ~
II.

PUBLIC LAND USE CONTROLS

Notwithstanding their use as fixed residences, mobile homes are
still distinguished from conventional dwellings for the purpose of in520, 549 P.2d 461 (1976} (same). See also SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 2.9; Bartke &
Gage, supra note 3, at 495.
Modular homes are distinquished from mobile homes on the basis of exterior
construction and appearance; modular homes are supposedly indistinguishable from
conventional housing. See City of DeSoto v. Centurion Homes, Inc., 1 Kan. App. 2d
634, 573 P.2d 1081 {1977); SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 2.9.
30. Mobile homes were first recognized by the federal government as a form of
permanent housing in 1970 when President Nixon used them to bolster housing statistics. Kuklin, supra note 18, at 822. In the same year, Congress deemed mobile homes
eligible for Veteran's Administration loans. Act of Oct. 23, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-506,
84 Stat. 1108 (1970} (currently codified at Home, Condominium and Mobile Home
Loans, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1827 {1976)). It was not until August 22, 1974, that Congress
enacted the National Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-383, §§ 601-628, 88 Stat. 700 {1974} (codified at42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426
(1976)}, for "the purposes of [reducing] the number of personal injuries and deaths
and the amount of insurance costs and property damage resulting from mobile home
accidents and [improving] the quality and durability of mobile homes." 42 U.S.C.
§ 5401 {1976).
31. Anderson, supra note 9, at 156-57. See supra notes 3 & 7.
32. Accord Koester v. Hunterdon County Bd. of Taxation, 79 N.J. 381, 386,
399 A.2d 656, 658 {1979). Siting a mobile home generally consists of removal of the
wheels, axles, and running gear, placement of the dwelling on a permanent foundation, and connection to all the necessary utilities. E.g., Your Home, Inc. v. City of
Portland, 432 A.2d 1250 {Me. 1981}; Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470
P.2d 528 {1970}; Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 {1980}; State v. Work,
75 Wash. 2d 202, 449 P.2d 806 {1969}; see Note, The Immobile Mobile HomeBrownfield Subdz"vis£on, Inc. v. McKee, 25 DE PAULL. REv. 553, 558 {1976).
33. CJ. Town of Helena v. Country Mobile Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162 (Ala.
1980) (permanent structure}; City of Woodstock v. Boddy, 240 Ga. 477, 241 S.E.2d
236 {1978} (mobile homes neither portable nor a vehicle}; Morin v. Zoning Bd. of
Review, 102 R.I. 457, 232 A.2d 393 (1967} {same). See infra note 75.
34. Corning v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38, 40, 121 N.Y.S.2d 288, 291-92
(1953), quoted with approval i'n In re Willey, 128 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11, 14 {1958).
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terpreting and applying land use restrictions. 35 In the field of public
land control, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have consistently upheld ordinances that make a distinction between mobile
homes and site-built homes in the face of constitutional challenges. 36
The majority position is that a zoning ordinance may restrict mobile
homes from single family residential districts. 37 This generally results
in the limitation of mobile homes to mobile home parks. 38
Ordinances restricting the placement of mobile homes have survived constitutional challenges because they "facilitate the
community's exercise of its police power" 39 and thus meet the test of
constitutionality by bearing a substantial relationship to public health,
safety, and general welfare. 40 Where an ordinance fails to bear such a
substantial relationship, it fails to bear a reasonable relation to the
police power and is thus a violation of due process 41 as an unreasonable restriction on the free use of one's property. 42 Furthermore, a
denial of equal protection results where no rational reason can be
found for an ordinance distinguishing between mobiles homes and
!15. See infra notes !16-69, 77-89 & accompanying text.
!16. See Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 29!1, !1!11 n.!l, 302 N.W.2d 146,
159 n.3 (1981) (Coleman, C.J-, dissenting) and authority cited therein." 'It is now well
settled that within the framework of the police power, the location or use of mobile
homes ... may be restricted to certain zones, districts or localities and excluded from
other zones, districts or localities.' " Village of Cahokia v. Wright, 57 Ill. 2d 166, 169,
311 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1974) (quoting B. HODES & G. ROBERSON, THE LAW OF MOBILE
HOMES 13!1 (2d ed. 1964)). See infra notes !18-!19 & accompanying text.
37. E.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Mountain Air Ranch, 192 Colo. 364,
56!1 P.2d 341 (1977); Village of Cahokia v. Wright, 57 Ill. 2d 166, !Ill N.E.2d 15!1
(1974); City of Colby v. Hurtt, 212 Kan. 11!1, 509 P.2d 1142 (197!1); Town of Manchester v. Phillips, !14!1 Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d !13!1 (1962); State v. Larson, 292 Minn.
350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972); State ex rel Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.
1971); City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 6!1!1 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982); Duckworth
v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978); seeP. ROHAN, supra
note 6, § !1.03[!1][a] nn.25-28; Flippen, Constitutionality of Zoning Ordinances Which
Exclude Mobile Homes, 12 AM. Bus. L.J. 15, 21-22 (1974). See also Bartke & Gage,
supra note !I; Carter, supra note 10; Moore, supra note 8. Contra Robinson Twp. v.
Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
!18. See Carter, supra note 10, at !1!1-!15; Moore, supra note 8, at 11-1!1. See also
supra note 36.
!19. Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787, 792 (W. Va. 1980); accord
Gravatt v. Borough of Latrobe, 44 Pa. Commw. 475, 404 A.2d 729 (1979), appeal dismissed, 491 Pa. 424, 421 A.2d 210 (1980); Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91
Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).
40. State v. Larson, 292 Minn. !150, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972); Duckworth v. City
of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978); see SHEPARD"S, supra note 1,
§ 10.6!1; Carter, supra note 10, at 19.
41. Knibbe v. City of Warren, !16!1 Mich. 283, 109 N.W.2d 766 (1961).
42. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. !165 (1926). See Robinson
Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 29!1, !102 N.W.2d 146 (1981), discussed infra at notes 78-85
& accompanying text.
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conventionally constructed homes:u Thus, because a specific regulation must be an appropriate means for carrying out a proper police
purpose in order to withstand a challenge on due process or equal protection grounds, regulation that merely attempts to exclude that
which has been deemed "undesirable" is unconstitutional. 44
As indicated above, ordinances distinguishing between mobile
homes and site-built homes are upheld in the face of constitutional
challenges as a proper exercise of the municipality's police power. 45 In
Duckworth v. cz·ty of Bonney Lake, 46 the Washington Supreme Court
was faced ·with a constitutional challenge to an ordinance that excluded
mobile homes from those areas zoned for single family residential use.
Before unanimously upholding the ordinance, 47 the Duckworth court
determined that the ordinance was substantially related to a proper
police purpose. 48 In so doing, that court described many of the
arguments commonly advanced for distinguishing mobile homes from
site-built homes, including their lack of storage space and other space
limitations, 49 their effect on property values, 50 their effect on
43. See Begin v. Inhabitants of Sabattus, 409 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1979), in which
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that a slow-growth ordinance limiting
mt?bile home parks to four new dwelling unz·ts per year while allowing other housing
developments four new buildings (which could be apartment buildings consisting of
many dwelling units) per year was unconstitutional as violative of equal protection.
See Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 500.
In Clackamas County v. Dunham, 282 Or. 419, 579 P.2d 223, appeal dismissed,
439 U,S. 948 (1978), the Supreme Court of Oregon rejected an equal protection
challenge to an ordinance containing a classification distinguishing between mobile
homes and conventionally constructed homes claiming that equal protection extends
only to persons and not to "things." /d. at 427 n.8, 579 P.2d at 227 n.8. This argument, however, is wide of the mark because the denial of equal protection is to the
owners and/or occupiers of mobile homes and not to the mobile homes themselves. Cf.
Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787 (W. Va. 1980) (ordinance upheld in face
of due process and equal protection challenges).
44. See Flippen, 5upra note 37, at 20.
45. See supra note 36.
46. 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978).
47. /d.
48. As explained by the Duckworth court:
[A] municipality may exclude [mobile homes] from conventional
residential districts because as a nonconventional use they tend to lower,
adversely affect, or at least stunt the growth potential of the surrounding
land .•.. This problem does not derive from aesthetics alone. Economic concerns as well as concerns for orderliness, adequate parking and the proper
supply of municipal services are also legitimate bases for regulation .
. . • If zoning regulations stabilize the value of property, promote the
permanency of home surroundings, and add to the happiness and comfort of
citizens, they most certainly promote the general welfare.
Id. at 31, 586 P.2d at 868.
49. /d. at 29-30, 586 P.2d at 867.
50. Id. at 29, 31, 586 P.2d at 867-68.
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municipal services, 51 and their physical appearance. 52 The problem is,
however, that while these justifications asserted for distinguishing
mobile homes from site-built homes may satisfy the police power test
of constitutionality with regard to certain restrictions, it may be more
through inherent dislike for mobile homes than clear reason that
localities apply these justifications to a restriction such as the one in
Duckworth that excludes mobile homes from single family residential
areas.
The concern with space limitation is better addressed by an ordinance that specifically excludes dwellings that fail to meet minimum
spatial requirements 53 than by an ordinance that excludes all mobile
homes regardless of size. 54 Similarly, while the placement of some
models of mobile homes might adversely affect property values, other
models have been found to compare favorably with site-built homes, 55
invalidating any assumption that mobile homes have a per se negative
effect on property values. Furthermore, the asserted purpose of preventing a drain on municipal services is an arbitrary and irrational
reason for excluding mobile homes from single family residential
districts. While it may be true that a drain on municipal services could
result if mobile homes were restricted to mobile home parks, where
smaller lot sizes lead to greater population densities, the placement of
a single mobile home on a lot would be no more of a drain on
municipal services than the construction of a site-built home on the
same lot. 56
Various other arguments have been advanced for distinguishing
mobile homes from conventional homes. While some do have a basis
in fact, 57 many are better directed towards the trailer of yesteryear
51. Id. at 30, 586 P.2d at 867; seeP. ROHAN, supra note 6, at§§ 3.03[4][b][i][iii]; SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 10.66.
52. 91 Wash. 2d at 29-30, 586 P.2d at 867. It should be noted that in
Washington a zoning ordinance may take aesthetics into consideration, but may not
rely on aesthetic considerations alone. Id. Zoning for aesthetics is discussed infra at
notes 61-67.
53. See Currituck County v. Willey, 46 N.C. App. 835, 266 S.E.2d 52 (1980),
in which an ordinance that excluded all mobile homes that failed to meet the
minimum dimensional requirement of 24 1 x 60 1 was upheld as not violative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
54. In Duckworth, the mobile home in question measured 24 1 x 64 1 • 91 Wash.
2d at 23, 586 P.2d at 864.
55. Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981); Heath v.
Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980). See supra note 4.
56. The concern with the prevention of a drain of municipal services, asserted
in Duckworth in the consideration of an ordinance excluding mobile homes from
single family residential districts, see supra note 49 & accompanying text, is much better directed towards the regulation of mobile home parks because of the increased
population density. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 8, at 3-4.
57. See infra notes 60-61 & accompanying text.
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than the mobile home of today. 58 Mobile homes are regarded as more
susceptible to fire 59 and wind damage 60 than site-built dwellings. Accordingly, regulation that is directed towards reducing fire or wind
damage or protecting occupants from such damage bears a substantial
relationship to public health, safety, and the general welfare. 61 But
the safety of mobile home occupants in the event of fire or strong
winds, if affected at all by the placement of the dwelling, would probably be better served by the placement of mobile homes in single family
residential districts rather than in mobile home parks because such
damage, if it occurred, would be more easily confined to a single
dwelling in a single family residential district than in a mobile home
park where smaller lots and greater concentration of dwellings increase the likelihood of fire or flying debris spreading to adjacent
residences.
As indicated by the court in Duckworth, in order to justify a regulation that prohibits the placement of mobile homes in single family
residential districts some reliance must be placed on aesthetic considerations. 62 Most jurisdictions recognize aesthetics as a proper police

58. As recognized by the court in Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302
N.W.2d 146 (1981): "The disparate treatment of mobile homes seems to be based on
attitudes which once had but no longer have a basis in fact." Id. at 318, 302 N.W.2d
at 153; see SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, § 1.2; Anderson, supra note 9; Bartke & Gage,
supra note 3, at 494-97; Carter, supra note 10, at 17; Kuklin, supra note 18; Moore,
supra note 8, at 2-3; Note, supra note 3, at 159-60; Note, supra note 10, at 702-03.
59. There is evidence that residents of conventional homes fare better in the
event of fire than do mobile home dwellers:
According to a study recently released by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD), the concern with fire protection for mobile
homes is very real. The study reveals that there is a higher death rate for victims of mobile home fires compared to occupants of conventional residential
dwellings. One reason for this is that because of the nature of the construction of mobile homes, mobile home dwellers are more likely to be trapped in
the event of a fire than are inhabitants of conventional homes.
Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787, 792 n.5 (W.Va. 1980) (citing NATIONAL
FIRE DATA CENTER, FIRE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL MOBILE HOME
CONSTRUCTION AND SAFETY STANDARD (Sept. 9, 1980)); see Anderson, supra note 10,
at 156; see also City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982).
60. Wind damage to mobile homes has prompted Tiedown legislation requiring mobile homes to be securely fastened to the ground so they cannot be moved by
strong winds. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 700.060-.085 (Vernon 1979); Tennessee
Manufactured Housing Anchoring Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 53-6201-09 (Supp.
1981); cf. Koester v. Hunterdon County Bd. of Taxation, 79 N.J. 381, 386, 399 A.2d
656, 658 (1979) (hurricane straps). See generally SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, app. C.
61. See National Mobile Home Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974,
42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-5426 (1976). See also SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, §§ 3.1-.6, app. C.
62. See supra note 52 & accompanying text.
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purpose for zoning. 65 As explained by Justice Douglas of the United
States Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker: 64
It is within the power of the legislature to determine 'that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled ....
If those who govern ... decide that the [community] should
be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way. 65
Given the validity of aesthetic zoning, it is not exactly clear that all
ordinances upheld on aesthetic grounds serve aesthetic goals. In
Gravatt v. Borough of Latrobe, 66 the court held that a mobile home
could be excluded from a residential area on the grounds of aesthetic
and property values notwithstanding that, aside from its original
mobility, the mobile home conformed to all that was required of single
family dwellings: "If it had been constructed on the site, from the
same materials and with the same plans, and had been built on the
same foundation, it would have complied with all zoning requirements. " 67 Gravatt demonstrates how inappropriate a flat prohibition
of mobile homes is as a means of aesthetic regulation; 68 the mobile
63. Bufford, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: A New Majority ofjurisdictions
Authon"ze Aesthetic Regulation, 48 UMKC L. REV. 125 (1980); see, e.g.,
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26 {1954); State v. Diamond Motors, Inc., 50 Hawaii 33, 429 P.2d 825 (1967);
State ex rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d 217,
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
64. 348 U.S. 26 {1954). In Berman, the Court upheld the constitutionality of
the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1947, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to
-719 (1955) (as amended D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-801 to -840 {1981)), a beautification
project entailing the use of eminent domain on land to be turned over to private enterprise. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
65. I d. at 33; accord Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586
P.2d 860 (1978); State ex rel Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262,
69 N.W.2d 217, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 {1955).
66. 44 Pa. Cornrow. 475, 404 A.2d 729 {1979), appeal dismissed, 491 Pa. 424,
421 A.2d 210 (1980).
67. Id. at 476, 404 A.2d at 729-30. In Gravatt, the mobile home in question
was held to be excluded based on a specific finding that property values would be affected in the neighborhood and that the mobile home would be "non-conforming as to
style." /d. Thus, although a site-built home of the same physical appearance could be
built on the site, the mobile home was excluded for aesthetic reasons. This apparent
incongruity results from the court's imposition of an aesthetic standard to uphold the
classification "mobile home," while the Borough of Latrobe did not impose a similar
aesthetic standard on site-built homes.
68. One writer has taken the view that it may be an infringement of the first
amendment right of freedom of expression to regulate architecture solely for aesthetic
reasons. Kollis, Archi'tectural Expression: Polz'ce Power and the First Amendment, 16
URB. L. ANN. 273 (1979). See also Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 500.
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home was excluded not because of the quality or manner of its construction but, rather, merely because it was built in a factory rather
than on the site. An ordinance that classifies on the basis of this distinction clearly fails to focus on aesthetic considerations. The place of
a dwelling's construction has no bearing on whether the dwelling
meets aesthetic standards. Accordingly, classifications distinguishing
between site-built homes and mobile homes that are justified on
aesthetic grounds merit careful examination because an ordinance
that so classifies may be no more than an unconstitutional attempt to
exclude "undesirables." 69
While ordinances restricting mobile homes from single family
dwelling districts have been upheld in most jurisdictions, 70 not all jurisdictions have adopted ordinances affording such favorable treatment. In Morin v. Zoning Board of Review, 71 the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island addressed an ordinance restricting the placement of
mobile homes to mobile home parks72 and held that a mobile home,
once permanently sited, 73 has not only all the appurtenances of a single
family home but, with running gear removed, is no longer portable
nor a vehicle, and thus no longer a "mobile home." 74 Adopting the
69.
70.
71.
72.
follows:

See supra note 44 & accompanying text.
See supra notes 36-38, 45 & accompanying text.
102 R.I. 457, 232 A.2d 393 {1967).
The zoning ordinance under consideration defined "mobile home" as

Trailer (or 'mobile home')-any vehicle or similar portable structure designed and constructed so as to permit the occupancy thereof as a dwelling by
one or more persons and so designed and constructed that it is or may be
mounted on wheels and used as a conveyance on a street or highway, propelled
or drawn by its own or other motive power.
ld. at 460, 232 A.2d at 394-95 {quoting LINCOLN, R.I., ZONING ORDINANCE, art.
XIII,§ 21 (emphasis added by court)). The ordinance required all dwellings coming
within this definition to be located in an authorized trailer camp. 102 R.I. at 458, 232
A.2d at 394.
73. The Mon"n court found that the mobile home in question was "attached to
the real estate." I d. at 459-60, 232 A.2d at 394. The mobile home had been set upon a
foundation of cement blocks, the wheels had been removed, and the mobile home had
been connected to water, electricity, telephone, and sewage. ld.
74. Morin v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 102 R.I. 457, 232 A.2d 393 {1967); accord
State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 204, 449 P.2d 806 {1969); see Town of Helena v. Country
Mobile Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1980); City of Woodstock v. Boddy, 240 Ga.
477, 241 S.E.2d 236 {1978). Contra City of Oakdale v. Benoit, 342 So. 2d 691 (La.
Ct. App.), cert. denied, 344So. 2d 670 {La. 1977); TownofManchesterv. Phillips, 343
Mass. 591, 180 N.E.2d 333 (1962); Gravatt v. Borough of Latrobe, 44 Pa. Commw.
475, 404 A.2d 729 {1979), appeal dismissed, 491 Pa. 424, 421 A.2d 210 {1980). It is interesting to note that none of the jurisdictions that have so held permit regulation on
the basis of aesthetics alone. See Bufford, supra note 63, at 136, 148, 160-62.
It is clear that where the municipality has not enacted an ordinance restricting
mobile homes to mobile home parks, mobile homes may be considered single family
dwellings for the purpose of a single family dwelling restriction. Your Home, Inc. v.
City of Portland, 432 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1981); Lescault v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 91 R.I.
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same rule that has led many states to tax mobile homes as real property rather than personal property,1 5 the Morz"n court found that the
provision directed toward mobile homes no longer applied once the
mobile home had lost its mobility because the dwelling was no longer
"mobile." 76 Thus, while mobile homes are generally distinguished
from conventional homes, the distinction may disappear once the
mobile home has been affixed to the realty. 77
The Supreme Court of Michigan in Robinson TownsMp v. KnolF 8
invalidated a similar ordinance upon a finding that the ordinance at
issue 79 unconstitutionally distinguished mobile homes from conventionally constructed homes on the basis of characteristics present upon
manufacture and delivery rather than on the basis of characteristics
present as the residence. exists on the site bearing the restriction. 80 Exhibiting one of the most progressive attitudes taken towards the regu277, 162 A.2d 807 (1960); City of Sioux Falls v. Cleveland, 75 S.D. 548, 70 N.W.2d 62
(1955); In re Willey, 120 Vt. 359, 140 A.2d 11 (1958); see Bartke & Gage, supra note
3, at 504-05; Carter, supra note 10, at 35-37; cf. Reed v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 31 Pa.
Commw. 605, 377 A.2d 1020 {1977) (mobile home a "single family dwelling" under
ordinance and thus permitted in single family residential district).
75. E.g., Koester v. Hunterdon C~unty Bd. of Taxation, 79 N.J. 381, 399
A.2d 656 {1979); accord MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 19(c) (1980); N.Y. REAL PROP.
TAX LAW§ 102{12)(g) (McKinney 1979); see Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 519-24;
Note, supra note 10. See generally SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, §§ 7.1-.18 & Table 4.
76. 102 R.I. at 460, 232 A.2d at 395. This approach has been criticized as a
semantic game. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 499-507.
77. Cf. Billings v. Shrewsbury, 294 S.E.2:i 267 (W.Va. 1982) {dwelling not a
mobile home within meaning of covenant if not movable after set-up).
78. 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
79. The ordinance described mobile homes in the following manner:
A movable or portable dwelling constructed to be towed on its own
chassis, connected to utilities and designed without a permanent foundation
for year-round living as a single family dwelling. A mobile home may contain
parts that may be separated, folded, collapsed, or telescoped when being
towed and combined or expanded later to provide additional cubic capacity.
ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE, art. II, § 203 {1974), quoted in
Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 333 n.2, 302 N.W.2d 146, 160 n.2 (1981)
(Moody, J., dissenting).
The ordinance further provided that "[m]obile homes are considered as dwelling
units and are not permitted as an accessory use to a permitted principal use and are
permitted only in approved mobile home parks." Id. at 308 n.2, 302 N.W.2d at 148
n.2 (quoting ROBINSON TOWNSHIP, MICH., ZONING ORDINANCE, art. II, § 307.1
(1974)).
80. As explained by the court:
Just as "the reasonableness of a zoning restriction must be tested according to existing facts and conditions and not some condition which might exist
in the future", so must an ordinance restricting the placement of mobile
homes be directed to the dwelling as it will exist on the land, and not, as
here, to its characteristics when delivered to the site.
410 Mich. at 315-16, 302 N.W.2d at 152 (citation omitted).
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lation of mobile homes, 81 the Michigan court was careful to limit its
holding so as to preserve some distinction between mobile homes and
site-built homes. That court stated that regulations aimed at assuring
that a mobile home placed in a single family residential district "compares favorably" with the conventional homes permitted within the
district would not exceed the police power and would thus be constitutional.82
In retaining a distinction between mobile homes and site-built
homes, the Robz"nson court explained that case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the regulation under consideration meets
the above standard; otherwise, the dwelling would be excluded "merely
because it is a mobile home." 83 Although the opinion fails to define
the favorable comparison standard, 84 this standard, along with the
requisite case-by-case analysis, represents the only rational manner by
which mobile homes can be excluded from single family residential districts. An ordinance that can operate to exclude a mobile home that
compares favorably with the other housing that would be permitted on
the site can be no more than an effort to exclude the mobile home
because it, or its occupants, have been perceived as undesirable. 85
While most legislative and regulatory bodies distinguish between
mobile homes and conventional single family homes with regard to zoning restrictions, there is one marked exception. 86 In 1975, the Vermont
81. Michigan has previously been noted for its progressive attitude towards
mobile home regulation. See P. ROHAN, supra note 6, § 3.03[1] n.5; see also 2 A.
RATHKOPF, supra note 11, § 19.01 n.2 (Supp.).
82. The Robinson court was careful to limit the effect of its holding:
This is not to say that a municipality must permit all mobile homes,
regardless of size, appearance, quality of manufacture or manner of installation on the site, to be placed wherever site-built single-family homes have
been built or are permitted to be built. Nor do we hold that a municipality
may no longer provide for mobile-home parks. We hold only that a per se
restriction is invalid; if a particular mobile home is excluded from areas
other than mobile-home parks, it must be because it fails to satisfy standards
designed to assure that the home will compare favorably with other housing
that would be allowed on that site, and not merely because it is a mobile
home.
410 Mich. at 321, 302 N.W.2d at 154; see Your Home, Inc. v. City of Portland, 432
A.2d 1250 (Me. 1981) (zoning board without power to restrict mobile homes from
areas zoned for one-family dwellings). See supra note 4.
83. 410 Mich. at 321, 302 N.W.2d at 154. See supra note 82.
84. For a discussion of the favorable comparison standard, see infra notes
125-50 & accompanying text.
85. See supra note 43 & accompanying text. The argument that mobile home
dwellers represent a section of life that is in any way undesirable has been aptly
refuted. Kuklin, supra note 18, at 812-19; see Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 495;
Carter, supra note 10, at 17.
86. Michigan may soon join Vermont as a jurisdiction in which the distinction
between mobile homes and site-built homes has been legislatively abolished for pur-
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legislature repealed a provision that had permitted municipalities to
restrict mobile homes to mobile home parks. 87 In its stead, the Vermont legislature adopted the most egalitarian approach toward
mobile homes in enacting a statute that provides that "no zoning
regulation shall have the effect of excluding mobile homes ... from
the municipality, except upon the same terms and conditions as conventional housing is excluded. " 88 Thus, only where the mobile home
does not meet the standards imposed on all other single family dwellings can it be excluded from a single family residential zone. 89
In abolishing all distinction between mobile homes and site-built
homes for the purpose of zoning, the Vermont legislature has mandated
that only a single set of standards may be imposed on dwellingswhether the dwelling be site-built or factory-built. While ostensibly
the position most favorable to mobile homes, it may be less favorable
than the position of the Robinson court. 90 A mechanical application
of site-built dwelling standards to mobile homes has been used as an
effective means of excluding mobile homes. 91 Without a provision that
compliance with state and/ or national construction standards shall be
deemed compliance with local construction codes and zoning restrictions, 92 mobile homes may be excluded by provisions intended for site-

poses of zoning. The Michigan Legislature is currently considering legislation contain·
ing the following provisions:
The installation of manufactured housing which is or is designed to be
a single family residential dwelling shall be permitted in any zoning district
in which conventionally constructed single family dwellings are permitted
and shall be treated by local governments in the same manner as conventionally constructed single family dwellings for all purposes of zoning. . . .
A local government shall not entirely exclude, restrict, or limit
manufactured housing to a zoning district or districts segregated from those
districts in which conventionally constructed residential housing of a similar
nature is permitted.
Mich. H. 4423, §§ 4(1), 5 (1981).
87. 1967 Vt. Acts, No. 334, § 1 (1967) (repealed 1975) (formerly codified at
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4407(11) (1975)).
88. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4406(4)(A) (Supp. 1982).
89. I d. Single family dwelling requirements have been enforced against mobile
homes sited outside of licensed mobile home parks in other jurisdictions. Bennett v.
Guthridge, 225 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1975); Corning v. Town of Ontario, 204 Misc. 38,
121 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1953); accord Lower Merion Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572,
46 A.2d 35, appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946); see Moore, supra note 8, at 13-16.
90. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
91. E.g., Bennett v. Guthridge, 225 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1975); Lower Merion
Twp. v. Gallup, 158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35, appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669
(1946); see Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 499-506; Carter, supra note 10, at 29-33;
Kuklin, supra note 18, at 791-92; Moore, supra note 8, at 13-16.
92. While 42 U.S.C. § 5403(d) (Supp. IV 1980) provides that the federal con-
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built homes but inappropriate as applied to mobile homes. Thus, between the position taken by the Vermont Legislature-no distinction
between mobile homes and conventional homes-and that taken by
the Michigan court in Robinson-the retention of the distinction
tempered with careful examination into a particular ordinance to see
whether it serves the purpose of assuring that mobile homes compare
favorably ·with site-built homes 93 -only the Michigan position ensures
that where a mobile home is excluded from a single family district,
there is a rational basis for that exclusion. 94

III.

PRIVATE LAND USE CONTROLS

In the field of private land controls, courts have similarly recognized a distinction between mobile homes and site-built homes. As a
general rule, a carefully drafted restrictive covenant expressly prohibiting mobile homes will be enforced. 95 Because a covenant is an
agreement between private parties, it is governed by the intent of the
parties. 96 Accordingly, where the intent of the parties is clear, the
struction and safety standards preempt state and local standards as to those aspects of
performance addressed by the federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 5422{a) allows states and
localities to assert jurisdiction over any other construction or safety standard, which
also allows exclusion by zoning ordance.
In Snohomish County v. Thompson, 19 Wash. App. 768, 577 P.2d 627 (1978), it
was held that the state had preempted the county's building, electrical, and plumbing codes by the following provision: "Any mobile home . . . that meets the requirements prescribed under [WASH. REv. CODE ANN.§] 43.22.340 [{1970)] shall not
be required to comply with any ordinances of a city or county prescribing requirements for body and frame design, construction or plumbing, heating and electrical equipment installed in mobile homes .... " Id. at 770, 577 P.2d at 629.
93. See supra notes 79-85 & accompanying text.
94. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
95. Jones v. Cook, 271 Ark. 870, 611 S.W.2d 506 {1981); South Shores Home
Ass'n v. Holland Holiday's, 219 Kan. 744, 549 P.2d 1035 {1976). Cf. DeLaurentis v.
Vainio, 169 Mont. 520, 549 P.2d 461 {1976) (covenant prohibited mobile campers and
tents rather than mobile homes). See SHEPARD'S, supra note 1, §§ 8.1-.12; Banke &
Gage, supra note 3, at 519; Moore, supra note 8, at 21. But see Billings v. Shrewsbury,
294 S.E.2d 267 (W. Va. 1982) (covenant expressly prohibiting mobile homes not enforced against a factory-built dwelling that was no longer movable after set-up). See
supra notes 71-77 & accompanying text.
See Mitchell v. Killins, 408 So. 2d 969 {La. App. 1981) in which a mobile home
was held to be excluded by a covenant which provided that "[c]onstruction of new
buildings only shall be permitted, it being the intent of this covenant to prohibit the
moving of any existing building onto a lot and remodeling or converting same into a
dwelling unit in this subdivision." Id. at 971.
96. Restrictive covenants are often likened to contracts. Cf. Timmerman v.
Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970) {applying contract rules of construction
to covenants). See infra note 115.
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covenant will be enforced97 unless it is illegal, 98 unreasonable, 99 or
contrary to public policy. 100 Because an agreement between two parties not to place a mobile home on a specified piece of property is
neither illegal nor clearly against public policy and is generally found
to be reasonable, such a covenant is enforceable. 101
While the general rule holds true where the covenant is explicit,
jurisdictions differ where the covenant fails to use the express words
"mobile home. " 102 As a general rule in the construction of all
covenants, covenants are to be construed strictly against the party
seeking to enforce the restriction; all doubts are to be resolved in favor
of the free use and enjoyment of one's property. 103
97. E.g., Laney v. Early, 292 Ala. 227, 292 So. 2d 103 (1974); Stockdale v.
Lester, 158 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1968); South Shore Home Ass'n v. Holland Holiday's,
219 Kan. 744, 549 P.2d 1035 (1976); Longv. Branham, 271 N.C. 264, 156 S.E.2d 235
(1967); Kindler v. Anderson, 433 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1967).
98. See, e.g., Wisneiwski v. Starr, 393 So. 2d 488 (Ala. 1980); Carter v. Conroy,
25 Ariz. App. 434, 544 P.2d 258 (1976); Hagan v. Sabat Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1966); Hamilton v. Broyles, 57
Tenn. App. 116, 415 S.W.2d 352 (1966) (cert. denied by state supreme court on May
15, 1967).
99. E.g., Wisneiwski v. Starr, 393 So. 2d 488 (Ala. 1980); Hagan v. Sabat
Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 489 (Fla.
1966); Stipp v. Wallace Plating, Inc., 96 Idaho 5, 523 P.2d 822 (1974); Lamica v.
Gerdes, 270 N.C. 85, 153 S.E.2d 814 (1967); Thompson v. Rorschach, 416 P.2d 898
(Okla. 1966). A restriction that amounts to a prohibition of the use of the land is clear·
ly unreasonable. Baker v. Henderson, 137 Tex. 266, 153 S.W.2d 465 (1941); see 7 G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY§ 3161 (1968).
100. E.g., Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 192 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1966); Lamica v. Gerdes, 270 N.C. 85, 153 S.E.2d
814 (1967).
101. See, e.g., Wisneiwski v. Starr, 393 So. 2d 488 (Ala. 1980); see also Vickery
v. Powell, 267 S.C. 23, 225 S.E.2d 856 (1976) (restrictions did not give rise to negative
equitable easements). Although not clearly unreasonable (at least between the original
covenantors) because of the consensual nature of the arrangement, it may be argued
that a restriction prohibiting mobile homes from a lot upon which a conventional
single family home may be constructed is unreasonable for the reasons that an ordi·
nance bearing such a restriction is unreasonable. See supra notes 48-94 & accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 154-56.
102. Compare Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980) (restrictive
covenant against "trailer" held not to prohibit double-wide mobile home) with Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970) (restrictive covenant requiring "one-family dwelling house" and prohibiting "structure of a temporary character,
trailer," etc., held to prohibit double-wide mobile home) and Lassiter v. Bliss, 559
S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1977) (restrictive covenant prohibiting "trailer" held to prohibit
mobile home). See infra notes 104-27 & accompanying text.
103. E.g., Kennedy v. Henley, 293 Ala. 657, 309 So. 2d 435 (1975); Casebeer v.
Beacon Realty, Inc., 248 Ark. 22, 449 S.W.2d 701 (1970); Bales v. Duncan, 231 Ga.
813, 204 S.E.2d 104 (1974); Stockdale v. Lester, 158 N.W.2d 20 (Iowa 1968); Nonh
Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629
(1976); Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980); Huggins v. Castle Estates,
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Many courts have been asked to apply these rules of construction
to exclude mobile homes from areas bound by covenants prohibiting a
"structure of a temporary character" or a "trailer." 104 Given the rules
of construction, the permanent nature of most mobile homes, and the
distinction between most mobile homes and trailers, 105 it would seem
that such covenants would be ineffective as applied to mobile homes.
Mobile homes have, however, been held to be excluded by covenants
containing such language. 1 0 6
In Lassiter v. Bliss, 107 the Supreme Court of Texas was faced with
just such a covenant being invoked against a mobile home. 108 Citing a
lower appeals court case, 109 the Lassiter court approved the rule that "as
a matter oflaw ... a mobile home with the wheels removed, placed on
blocks and hooked to lights and water is still a trailer, " 110 and held
that the mobile home was excluded by the covenant. 111
Lassiter was decided over a vigorous dissent112 which berated the
majority for failing to apply the basic rules of covenant construction. 113
The dissent insisted that it could not have been within the contemplation of the parties to exclude a mobile home by the use of the word
"trailer, " 114 and that the rules of strict construction do not allow for
Inc., 36 N.Y.2d 427, 330 N.E.2d 48, 369 N.Y.S.2d 80 (1975); Stegall v. Housing
Auth., 278 N.C. 95, 178 S.E.2d 824 (1971); Land Developers, Inc. v. Maxwell, 537
S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1976); McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 2d 607, 157 N.W.2d 665
(1968); see G. THOMPSON, supra note 99, at§ 3160.
104. E.g., Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61 Ill. 2d 168, 334 N.E.2d
131 (1975); Timmerman v. Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970); Heath v.
Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980); Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
1977).
105. See supra note 7.
106. Brownfield Subdivision, Inc. v. McKee, 61 Ill. 2d 168, 334 N.E.2d 131
(1975); Jones v. Beiber, 251 Iowa 969, 103 N.W.2d 364 (1960); Timmerman v.
Gabriel, 155 Mont. 294, 470 P.2d 528 (1970); Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex.
1977); see Banke & Gage, supra note 3, at 515-18; Moore, supra note 8, at 19-20;
Note, supra note 32. Contra North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71
Mich. App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976); Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d
818 (1980).
107. 559 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1977).
108. The covenant being construed read: "No trailer, basement, tent, garage or
temporary quarters shall at any time be used as a residence ... ."/d. at 355.
109. Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
110. 559 S.W.2d at 355.
111. /d. "[W)e hold that the mobile home in this case was a 'trailer' and was
prohibited by the restrictive covenant. The term 'trailer' is to be understood in its
usual meaning regardless of whether it is referred to or described as a house trailer or
mobile home." Id. at 356 (citations omitted).
112. Justice Sam D. Johnson dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Steakley
and Pope. Id. at 359-63.
113. Id. at 359.
114. Id. at 359-63. Pointing out that the covenant had been created in 1948,
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extension by implication. 115 Arguing that only by implication could
"trailer" be read to include a mobile home, the dissent found that
"neither the intention of the parties nor a strict reading of the covenant supports a finding that mobile homes are encompassed by the
restriction . . . . " 116 The mobile home was excluded by the majority,
however, based on a finding that it was within the intentions of the
parties. 117
Not all courts faced with such a situation have held a mobile home
to be excluded by a covenant prohibiting trailers. In North Cherokee
Vz"llage Membershz"p v. Murphy, 118 the Michigan Court of Appeals
held that defendants' double-wide mobile home was not a "house
trailer" within the meaning of the covenant being construed. 119
Noting that the particular dwelling in question was no less permanent
than pre-fabricated housing that would be permitted by the
covenant, 120 and that it complied with the other restrictions in the
deed, 121 the court of appeals based its holding on the finding that
the dissent explained that "[t]he mobile home is a structure physically, functionally,
and socially distinct from the trailer of the 1940's as well as from the trailer of the
1970's." Id. at 359·60. The dissent continued on to examine the histories of both
mobile homes and trailers. See id. at 360-62.
115. "Construction of a restrictive covenant, as with any other contract, is
governed by the intent of the parties at the time the covenant is made and will not be
extended by implication." Id. at 359 (citations omitted); accord Naiman v. Bilodeau,
225 A.2d 758 (Me. 1967); North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich.
App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976).
116. 559 S.W.2d at 363.
117. Id. at356.
118. 71 Mich. App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976).
119. "[T]his court is asked to engage in semantic slight [sic] of hand by declaring
a two piece mobile home, bereft of its chassis and securely joined together, to be a
house trailer. We decline the invitation." Id. at 598-99, 248 N.W.2d at 632.
120. Id. at 599, 248 N.W.2d at 632.
121. The restrictive covenants prohibited dwellings ofless than 900 square feet of
living area or those with flat roofs; defendants' mobile home had 1,056 square feet of
living area and a gabled roof. Id. at 594, 248 N.W.2d at 630. Explaining its decision,
the North Cherokee court concurred with the following statement:
The courts must acknowledge that pre-built homes, mobile or otherwise,
which in a given case may be more attractive in appearance and design than
many conventional homes built completely on the site, are a part of our
changing society, and give recognition to the fact that the law must be
responsive to the best interests of those whom it is designed to serve. Unless
such dwellings are expressly and explicitly excluded by the terms of a protective covenant, their use should not be enjoined, provided that in each case,
the dwelling otherwise conforms to the spirit of the restriction.
Yeager v. Cassidy, 20 Ohio Misc. 251, 256, 253 N.E.2d 320, 323-24 (1969), quoted
with approval in North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592,
601, 248 N.W.2d 629, 633 (1976) and Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 681-82, 604
P.2d 818, 819-20 (1980).
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defendants' home compared favorably with the conventional homes in
the neighborhood. 122
In Heath v. Parker, 123 the Supreme Court of New Mexico similarly
refused to enforce against a mobile home owner a covenant prohibiting "trailers." Holding the mobile home under consideration to
be "substantially the same" as a conventional home, 124 the Heath
court determined that case-by-case examination into the particular
facts and circumstances is required in such instances. 125 Examining
the Parkers' mobile home, the Heath court found that it had the appearance of a conventional single family home and that it compared
favorably with the other homes in the neighborhood. 126 Because the
facts of the particular case indicated that the covenant was not intended to exclude a home such as the Parkers', the restriction was held inapplicable.127
Both the Heath court and the North Cherokee court ruled that the
mobile home under consideration fell outside of the scope of the restriction based upon a finding that the mobile home compared favorably with site-built homes. 128 These courts looked beyond the name by

122. In coming to the decision that the mobile home compared favorably with
site-built homes, the North Cherokee court made the following observation:
If given the opportunity to resume improvements on the property which
were halted by this litigation, appellants should be able to blend their dwelling into the surrounding landscape in a manner akin to other houses in the
subdivision. Once appellants' planned landscaping of the property and erection of a carport are completed, their modular unit should closely resemble a
conventionally built home which we note ... already stands in one of the
North Cherokee subdivisions.
71 Mich. App. at 600, 248 N.W.2d at 633.
123. 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980), noted zn Dean, What is a Mobile
Home? The Law and Manufactured Housing, 86 CASE & CoM. (No. 5) 10 (Sept.·Oct.
1981).
It is interesting to note that in coming to its decision, the Heath court found
Hussey v. Ray, 462 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), persuasive after it had been ex·
pressly disapproved in Lassz"ter. 93 N.M. at 681, 604 P.2d at 819; see Lassiter v. Bliss,
559 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1978). See supra notes 107-17 & accompanying text for a
discussion of Lassiter. But cf. Currey v. Roark, 635 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982)
(mobile home excluded by covenant based on finding that it was a permanent structure under a test promulgated by the Hussey court).
124. 93 N.M. at 682, 604 P.2d at 820; see also Naiman v. Bilodeau, 225 A.2d
758 (Me. 1967).
125. 93 N.M. at 682, 604 P.2d at 820.
126. I d. at 681, 604 P .2d at 819. The Heath court found that "[i]t strains one's
credulity to state that Parker's home is a temporary structure, or a 'trailer.' "Id. at
682, 604 P .2d at 820.
127. Mter examining photographs of the dwelling, the Heath court found that
"the placing of the Parker home on his lots does not violate the letter or the spirit of
the restrictive covenants.'' Id. at 682, 604 P.2d at 820.
128. See supra notes 122, 126 & accompanying text.
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which the dwelling is called to examine the particular facts and circumstances in determining whether.it was within the intention of the
covenantors to exclude a dwelling such as the one under consideration. Rather than pronouncing a general rule that all mobile homes
are or are not excluded by a covenant with such wording, as did the
court in Lassz"ter, 129 these courts recognized that the purpose of the
restrictions would best be served by case-by-case analysis to determine
whether the enforcement of the restriction against the dwelling in
question would result in the exclusion of a dwelling that compares
favorably with the other housing in the area.
IV.

THE FAVORABLE COMPARISON STANDARD

The favorable comparison standard adopted in Heath and North
Cherokee in the consideration of private land controls is essentially the
same as that adopted in Robz"nson Townshz"p v. Knol[I 30 in the consideration of public land controls. 131 These decisions stand for the
proposition that in the consideration of a prohibition on the free use of
one's property, all of the surrounding facts and circumstances regarding both the reason for and the object of the restriction must be examined. Consideration must go beyond the name by which a dwelling
is called 132 to a determination of whether the dwelling in question
compares favorably with housing permissible on the site or whether it
falls within the scope of the restriction.
In reviewing a restriction on the use of property, whether imposed
publicly or agreed upon privately, a court should not limit its consideration to whether the dwelling was built in a factory or on the
site. 133 Each instance in which a restriction is sought to be enforced
129. See supra note 111.
130. 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981). See supra notes 78-85 & accompanying text.
131. It is common for courts, when faced with an ordinance imposing a similar
restriction, to cite cases concerning covenants (and vice versa). See, e.g., Robinson
Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 319-20, 302 N.W.2d 146, 154 (1981) (quoting Heath v.
Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 682, 604 P.2d 818, 818-19 (1980)). See also Bartke & Gage,
supra note 3, at 516; Note, supra note 32, at 554.
132. Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981); Heath v.
Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980); accord Town of Helena v. Country Mobile
Homes, Inc., 387 So. 2d 162 (Ala. 1980); Morin v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 102 R.I.
457, 232 A.2d 393 (1967); see Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 499-507; Carter, supra
note 10, at 17-19; Kuklin, supra note 18, at 802-05.
133. But see Jones v. Beiber, 251 Iowa 969, 103 N.W.2d 364 (1969), where the
"trailer" in question was excluded because it was "designed to be hauled" notwithstanding the concession that it was classifiable as a building and "as much of a dwelling as any house that is built on a permanent foundation." Id. at 972, 103 N.W.2d at
366.
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merits a close examination of the purposes for which the restriction
was imposed and whether that purpose would be served by enforcing
the restriction against the particular dwelling in question. 134 As explained by the courts in Robz"nson, Heath, and North Cherokee, this is
best accomplished by determining whether the dwelling compares
favorably with other housing that would be permitted on the site as
well as the housing existing in the surrounding area. 135
While it is clear that a decision to exclude a dwelling should not be
based on its place of manufacture or its name, 136 the question of which
factors may be taken into consideration in determining whether a particular dwelling compares favorably with its proposed environment
and the other homes that could be erected on the site remains to be
explored.
Restrictions imposed by legislative or regulatory authority must
bear a substantial relationship to the police power. 137 As explained by
the court in Robz"nson, the constitutionality of 'an ordinance can be
assured only by examining each restriction that distinguishes between
mobile homes and conventional single family homes and determining
that a reasonable basis for that distinction exists. 138 Where an ordinance distinguishes between the two types of dwellings solely on the
basis of place of construction, it clearly fails to serve a legitimate police
purpose; 139 only where an ordinance excludes a dwelling on the basis
of its existing characteristics on the site bearing the restriction and not
on the basis of its characteristics when first brought to the site can it
serve a legitimate police purpose. 140 Housing can be regulated only on
134. Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981). See
supra text accompanying notes 81-84, 93-94.
135. /d. at 321, 302 N.W.2d at 154; North Cherokee Village Membership v.
Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 600, 248 N.W.2d 629, 633 (1976); Heath v. Parker, 93
N.M. 680, 682, 604 P.2d 818, 820 (1980). See supra notes 81-84, 122, 126-30 & accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 131-32 & accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 39·44 & accompanying text.
138. 410 Mich. at 315-16, 321, 302 N.W.2d at 154, 156. See supra notes 80 &
82.
139. Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981); accord
Morin v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 102 R.I. 457, 232 A.2d 393 (1967); see Your Home,
Inc. v. City of Portland, 432 A.2d 1250 (Me. 1981); Begin v. Inhabitants of Sabattus,
409 .A:.2d 1269 (Me. 1981); see also City of Woodstock v. Boddy, 240 Ga. 477, 241
S.E.2d 236 (1980); State v. Work, 75 Wash. 2d 212, 449 P.2d 806 (1969). See supra
note 80.
140. Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 315-16, 302 N.W.2d 146, 152
(1981); cf. Bennett v. Guthridge, 225 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1975) (improper
foundation); Currituck County v. Willey, 46 N.C. App. 835, 266 S.E.2d 52 (1980)
(failure to meet minimum dimensional requirement); Lower Merion Twp. v. Gallup,
158 Pa. Super. 572, 46 A.2d 35, appeal dismissed, 329 U.S. 669 (1946) (failure to comply with building code). See supra notes 80 & 139.
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the basis of manner of construction, not place of construction. Accordingly, a case-by-case analysis is required to determine the basis
upon which an ordinance seeks to exclude a mobile home.
The community that wishes to preserve the exclusive nature of certain areas need not fear that the inability to rely on a per se exclusion
of mobile homes will leave it unable to restrict mobile homes from
such areas effectively . 141 A minimum dimensional requirement can exclude any mobile home that is not of a comparable size with the other
homes in the district. 142 A $30,000 mobile home could be restricted
from an area where all the homes are worth over $200,000 as being
grossly disproportionate in value. 143 Minimum height restrictions and
flat roof prohibitions could similarly exclude many mobile homes. 144
On the other hand, if the mobile home in question met the above requirements, 145 there would not be any reasonable basis for the exclusion. Other than to exclude something that has been deemed undesirable, there would be no reason to exclude a mobile home that is commensurate in size and improved property value and is comparable in
construction with the other dwellings in the area.
A similar analysis is required in the enforcement of regulations
directed toward conventional homes against mobile homes. 146 Mter a
determination that the restriction is one that serves a proper police
purpose, it must be determined whether that purpose would be served
by enforcing the restriction against the particular dwelling in question. It may be found that the purpose of certain structural requirements is satisfied even though the mobile home does not strictly
141. See supra note 82 & accompanying text.
142. E.g., Currituck County v. Willey, 46 N.C. App. 835, 266 S.E.2d 52
(1980). See supra notes 53-54 & accompanying text.
143. It is generally accepted that preservation of propeny values is a legitimate
purpose under the police power. E.g., Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 528
F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 1068 (1976), aff'd on rehearing, 558 F.2d
350 (6th Cir. 1977); seeR. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§§ 7.12, 8.25 (2d
ed. 1976 & Supp. 1979). See supra note 53 & accompanying text. By the use of the
figures $30,000 and $200,000 this writer intimates no opinion of how great of a
disparity must be found for the mobile home to be considered grossly disproponionate
in value.
144. But cf. North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App.
592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976) (mobile home with gabled roof).
145. This list of grounds for exclusion in the text is not meant to be exhaustive.
Other restrictions may also serve as grounds for excluding a mobile home if they satisfy
the goal of ensuring that a dwelling erected on the site compares favorably with the
other dwellings that would be permitted on the site. Additionally, other restrictions
must be examined to determine whether they exclude mobile homes in the manner
discussed in the text znjra accompanying notes 146-69.
146. See Banke & Gage, supra note 3, at 500, 512. But see Moore, supra note 8,
at 15 n. 75, 21.
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comply with the ordinan<:e. 147 An example of this would be an ordinance compelling all dwellings to have attached garages with a wall in
common for the purpose of complying with a single structure per lot
requirement. Because of the peculiarities of mobile home construction, this may be impractical as applied to mobile homes. For this
reason an adjoining garage, connected to the mobile home by either a
porch or breezeway, should be deemed substantial compliance with
the restriction. If the garag~. and mobile home were properly connected by the porch or breezeway, for all intents and purposes it would
be as if there was only a single structure on the lot. Accordingly, only
where both the purpose for the restriction is legitimate and where the
purpose has not been adequately addressed by other means can the
restriction be enforced. To do otherwise may be a failure to afford
owners of mobile homes equal protection of the laws 148 and to deny
them due process under the law. 149
Private restrictions, while normally not invoking constitutional
analysis, 150 similarly require the same case-by-case analysis as described
above. Although a restrictive covenant expressly prohibiting mobile
homes will generally be enforced as being within the intent of the covenanting parties, 151 where the covenant prohibits trailers or temporary
structures, the need for case-by-case analysis arises. 152 As explained by
the court in Heath, a careful examination into the facts and circumstances may reveal that the mobile home in question is much more
justifiably deemed a single family dwelling than a trailer or temporary
structure. 158
147. See Snohomish County v. Thompson, 19 Wash. App. 768, 577 P.2d 627
{1978), discussed supra at note 97.
148. See Bartke & Gage, supra note 3, at 500. See supra note 43 & accompanying text.
149. See Robinson Twp. v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 {1981). See
also supra note 40.
150. As explained by the Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
{1947), the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution {due process and
equal protection) apply only to governmental action, not private agreements. Id. at 9.
Accordingly, the Court found that the covenant in question~ which would have been
unconstitutional had it been an ordinance or regulation, did not violate the Constitution. Id. at 13. However, the Court refused to enforce the covenant, holding that
judicial enforcement of the covenant amounts to governmental action, and was thus
prohibited by the Constitution. Id. at 20.
151. See supra notes 95, 101 & accompanying text. But see z'nfra notes 154-56 &
accompanying text.
152. North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 248
N.W.2d 629 {1976); Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 {1980); accord
Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S. W.2d 353, 359-63 {Tex. 1977) (dissent). See supra notes 104-32
& accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 123-32 & accompanying text.
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Furthermore, even where mobile homes are expressly prohibited
by covenant, there is reason to invoke case-by-case analysis. Because of
the fine distinction between mobile homes and site-built homes, it
might be found that, notwithstanding the use of the words "mobile
home," a dwelling such as the one in question was not intended to be
excluded by the covenantors. 154 Especially where there is a comprehensive body of restrictions governing the characteristics of dwellings that are permissible on the site and the dwelling meets all other
restrictions, it should be permitted on the site, 155 irrespective of
whether it may be referred to by the name "mobile home." 156 Without
examination into the particular facts and circumstances, the covenant
may be enforced in such a fashion as to contravene the intentions of
the covenantors.
Public and private land controls both serve a similar purpose: to
preserve the character and integrity of a community. But to hold that
preservation of character and integrity requires the absence of all
change is to ignore the obvious-some change will and, in fact, must
occur . 157 It is only by careful evaluation so as to ensure that the
changes are reasonable can the integrity of a community be best preserved, not by resistance to every and all change. To hold that a permanently sited mobile home is anything but a single family dwelling is
to discriminate on the basis of origin and not on the basis of attributes
necessarily apparent when in use as a residence. 158 A restriction on the
use of property, whether public or private, must be read as being concerned only with those attributes characteristic of the dwelling in use.
A mobile home should be excluded only by means of a restriction that
examines the dwelling as it exists on the site and proscribes only those
dwellings that do not compare favorably with other permissible housing. Then, and only then, can the restriction be found to be
reasonable.
ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ

154. Billings v. Shrewsbury, 294 S.E.2d 267 (W.Va. 1982); see supra note 114.
It could also be argued that the dwelling, though a mobile home by origin, is one no
longer. See supra notes 33-34 & accompanying text. Contra Moore, supra note 8, at
21.
155. Naiman v. Bilodeau, 225 A.2d 758 (Me. 1967); North Cherokee Village
Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich. App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976); see supra note
121 & accompanying text.
156. But see DeLaurentis v. Vainio, 169 Mont. 520, 549 P.2d 461 (1976).
157. See supra note 121.
158. See supra notes 139-51 & accompanying text.
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APPENDIX
A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

The preceding note is directed toward litigation concerning the
placement of mobile homes under existing laws. The following legislation is suggested for those far-sighted jurisdictions that wish to address
such a situation before litigation arises:
Sec. 1: No mobile home, modular home, or other factorybuilt home shall be excluded from any lot upon which a single
family dwelling is permitted, except where the exclusion is for
failure to comply with standards designed to ensure that the
dwelling would compare favorably with the other dwellin~
permitted on that site.
Sec. 2: Only the following standards may be considered in
determining whether a mobile home, modular home, or other
factory-built home compares favorably with other permissible
dwellings:
·
(a) minimum lot size,
(b) distance from adjacent or nearby uses,
(c) minimum off-street parking facilities,
(d) landscaping and fencing,
(e) total usable living area,
(f) height,
(g) roof lines,
(h) improved property value, and
(i) architectural or historical significance.
The above legislation, if enacted, would allow each mobile home
proposed to be erected on a lot zoned for single family residential use
to be reveiwed administratively. Planning commissions and zoning
boards of appeal can apply the favorable comparison standard on a
case-by-case basis using the factors enume!ated in section 2. To conform with this legislation, municipalities should enact ordinances providing for administrative review, if desired, by allowing the residential
occupancy of mobile homes as a conditional use in single family residential districts to be granted as of right where a mobile home is
shown to comply with the favorable comparison standard.
While the above legislation directly addresses public regulation on
the use of mobile homes, it is the drafter's intent that this legislation
similarly apply to the exclusion of mobile homes by private restriction.

